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A recent article by Giubilini, Savulescu, and Wilkinson posed a timely question: should
we vaccinate children to save the old? According to the authors, this option could be
acceptable if a number of conditions applied. In this piece, I hold that its main claim—
that using children to fight epidemics is morally acceptable if this only causes them
little harm—is fair. However, this is only true if the idea of ‘small risk’ does not equate
to high risk to a small number of children. On the other hand, my reply shows that
the acceptability of vaccination of children should not be based on making exceptions
to the Kantian categorical imperative, but to the simple fact that we can rely on a
presumption of consent to altruistic behavior by children. Nevertheless, I also state that
this option would be the best strategy in the COVID-19 scenario. Isolating children
through the performance of tests in schools and institutes could be a better alternative,
since it would hinder their spreading of the disease without depriving the elderly of a
scarce resource, namely the vaccine.
† Iñigo de Miguel is Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Law. He is a well-known scholar in the EU, who
has written six books about bioethics and medical law and more than 150 papers and book chapters. He
has participated in more than 10 EU-funded research projects on these topics. He is currently leading the
PANELFIT project (panelfit.eu). He has acted as invited speakers in a lot of congresses and conferences. He
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I. INTRODUCTION
A recent article by Giubilini, Savulescu, and Wilkinson1 exposes an ethical issue that
deserves careful analysis: should we vaccinate children to save the old? The answer
provided by the authors is ‘yes’ under the condition that some circumstances apply,
namely: (i) the vaccines provide better results in children than in old people; (ii)
children are a vector for the contagion of the elderly, who are not adequately protected
by the vaccine; (iii) there is only a small harm to the children; and (iv) this demon-
strates to be the most effective strategy to save the greatest number of people. If all of
these conditions apply, then we should target children for vaccination instead of the
elderly, even though this might be considered as using children as mere means. In this
comment, I would like to address some of the statements made by the authors, clarify
some misconceptions and provide reasons to support that vaccinating children instead
of the elderly is not a good idea in the case of COVID-19.
II. CLARIFYING A MISCONCEPTION. VACCINATING CHILDREN
WOULD NOT BE ‘TREATING THEM AS MERE MEANS’
First, the article makes quite a strong claim by stating that sometimes ‘treating people as
means in a way that is harmful or disrespectful to them and without their consent may
be considered permissible’. I cannot agree with the authors on this. I certainly hold that
Kant’s categorical imperative (‘[s]o act that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely
as a means’) is a boundary that we should not cross. However, this does not imply that
we should not vaccinate children. Contrary to Giubilini, Savulescu, and Wilkinson, I
do not consider that we will defy this rule if we proceed to do so.
I concede that this issue is open to discussion since the concrete implications of
the categorical imperative are hard to draw. Indeed, philosophic discussion about the
meaning of the term ‘merely’ in this mandate continues and will probably last long.2
Nevertheless, I think that the examples provided by the authors to show that sometimes
breaking the Kantian mandate might be permissible are not good examples. The case
of the folic acid intake in pregnant women only shows that mothers are willing to
sacrifice themselves and take some risks to benefit their children. The second case—
the pediatric bone marrow donation—seems closer to the ‘using somebody as a mere
means’ scenario. However, I do not think that the analogy works either. Lots of people
donate bone narrow, blood, or even organs, and we usually do not consider those
actions as a kind of exploitation but an expression of altruism.
Of course, in the case of children there is a major difference compared with adults:
they cannot give consent. However, this does not imply that they are used as mere
means. We can apply the presumed consent concept perfectly in this case. We can
assume that if children were able to consent to altruistic initiatives that only create
a small risk or harm to them, they would do so. We proceed this way, for example,
when we decide to isolate them even though the disease probably causes them less
1 Alberto Giubilini, Julian Savulescu, Dominic Wilkinson, COVID-19 Vaccine: Vaccinate the Young to Protect the
Old?, 7(1) J. Law Biosci., lsaa050 ( Jan.–Dec. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/jlb/lsaa050.
2 Samuel Kerstein, Treating Persons as Means, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N.
Zalta ed., Summer 2019), Retrieved at: https://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10413/18798/
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damage than the process of isolation. Thus, we can agree on the idea that children
would accept a small sacrifice that could serve well to alleviate other people’s suffering.
Said in other words, we could consider that children would not be reluctant to behave
as altruistic people. Therefore, unless we consider that any form of altruism implies
treating ourselves or our descendants as mere means, vaccinating children instead of
the elderly does not imply breaking the categorical imperative.
III. THE SMALL RISK ISSUE
Giubilini, Savulescu, and Wilkinson wrote in their paper: ‘If the COVID-19 vaccine
is similar to flu vaccine, then by “using” children as a means to protect the elderly
and the vulnerable, we are using children as means in a way that also actually benefits
the children, as they acquire protection against COVID-19. Even if COVID-19 seems
to be not life-threatening for young children, it still is a disease that can cause some
complications and some level of pain or discomfort. And however small, there is some
risk of severe complications and death even in children’.
The authors’ argument, therefore, is that subjecting children to a small risk, even if
it is not in their best interests, would not be unethical if it benefits society significantly. I
totally agree with them on this point. Indeed, I find similar initiatives, such as the idea of
changing the strategy to fight seasonal flu by involving children in vaccination programs,
certainly attractive.3 However, there is an essential issue that must be kept in mind.
When we speak of small risk, we must distinguish between the risk for a group and
for specific individuals. In the case of some vaccines, such as influenza, the situation is
ideal, because the risk for the children is extremely low. Even better, vaccination brings
a certain benefit for them.4 In the case of COVID-19, the situation remains unclear. It
may be that the vaccine has a high risk of producing relatively mild side effects (fever,
diarrhea, vomiting). This means that complications will often happen, causing some
suffering to the subject, but only mildly. In my opinion, vaccination might be ethically
acceptable under such conditions: we can expect children to be altruistic enough to
endure a little inconvenience to help the elderly. However, it may also be the case that
the vaccine has a low risk (say 1/50,000) of causing profoundly serious side effects,
including death. This is much more worrying. If we know that this probability exists,
we can assume that in a country where there are 10 million inhabitants, of which 2
million are children, and we vaccinate all of them, 40 children will die. Since COVID
does not usually cause such consequences in healthy children, this means that we would
be assuming the death of those children in exchange for saving the lives of thousands of
people, certainly.
In my opinion, this would be ethically unacceptable. Indeed, this issue reminds me a
lot to John Harris’ survival lottery.5 For those who are not familiar with his provocative
thought experiment, this mental experiment suggests that since organ donation saves
lives, and donors are always scarce, we should draw a lottery whenever donations are
needed. Those selected would give up their lives to allow several people to live. Both
3 B. Bambery, T. Douglas, et al., Influenza Vaccination Strategies Should Target Children, 11 Public Health
Ethics 221, 234 (Dec. 2017). doi: 10.1093/phe/phx021.
4 Ek France, Jm Glanz, et al. Safety of the Trivalent Inactivated Influenza Vaccine Among Children: A Population-
Based Study, 158 Arch. Pediatr. Adolesc. Med. 1031, 1036 (Nov. 2004).
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in Harris’ proposal and the fictional case of coercive vaccination of children against
COVID described above, some people are sacrificed for the sake of society. In both,
the ex-ante cost is also small (given the very low probability of being selected to donate
organs or to die because of the vaccine), but we have to face a large post facto cost and
this seems to be unacceptable. Therefore, I think that we should clearly keep in mind
that when we talk about ‘small risk’ we are talking about mild consequences to children,
even though this includes a large percent of them, but not in any way severe side effects,
even though in a minimal number of them.
IV. THE REASON OF MY REFUTATION: THE EXISTENCE
OF A BETTER ALTERNATIVE
There is, finally, a third consideration that I would like to introduce. The proposal by
the authors is based on a postulate: that causing children a small harm could be justified
if this were the best alternative to protect society. But is this the case? I do not think so.
Even in the best-case scenario (the vaccine is effective in 95% of children and prevents
them from spreading the disease), some children (in this case 5%) could yet transmit
COVID. This means that they could cause serious harm to elderly people who had
been deprived of the scarce resource—namely, the vaccine—in their place. Therefore,
harming children in this case would not serve to protect the old at all, especially if we
consider that such an allocation would continue to make the elderly vulnerable against
the greater threats posed by other people, such as young adults, for instance.
To this must be added two other factors that play against vaccinating children
to protect the elderly. First, according to current data, children probably play only a
minimal role in the spreading of the infection to others.6 Therefore, they are not in
reality a great threat to the elderly. Second, to my knowledge, the clinical trials related
to the current group of COVID vaccines do not involve children. Consequently, we
will not have any evidence of the risks involved in the vaccination of children before
implementing our policies. This is an extraordinarily strong reason to oppose the use
of vaccines in children at this moment: ‘it is imperative that any policy mandating the
use of a COVID-19 vaccine follow the fullest assessment of safety’.7
Keeping this in mind, I think that the main claim in the article that I am commenting
on is not tenable. Furthermore, I consider that there are better strategies to protect
both children and the elderly. I will propose one: let us vaccinate the old as commonly
recommended. Then, let us carry out proper tests to ensure that children are not
infected by the virus. How can we do this? In practice, this is quite simple. Most children
go to school. If we undertake testing at least twice every week, they could hardly escape
surveillance and monitoring. Now that pool PCR with saliva becomes a real possibility,
this scenario seems particularly reachable.8 If we can implement it, it will be easy to
detect and trace positive cases. Therefore, we could separate infectious children from
the elderly and thus avoid transmission between them, without posing an unnecessary
6 Kostas Danis et al. Cluster of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) in the French Alps, February 2020, 71 Clin.
Infect. Dis. 825, 832 (2020). doi:10.1093/cid/ciaa424.
7 DJ Opel, DS Diekema, Lf Ross. Should We Mandate a COVID-19 Vaccine for Children? JAMA Pediatr.
Published online Sept. 14, 2020. doi:10.1001/jamapediatrics.2020.3019.
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risk or harm to the children and without depriving the elderly of a useful resource, such
as the vaccine.
V. CONCLUSION
Keeping in mind all the arguments showed, my conclusion is that Giubilini, Savulescu,
and Wilkinson’s general claim—that using children to fight epidemics if this only
causes them little harm—is fair. However, this is not due to the acceptability of making
exceptions to the Kantian categorical imperative, but to the simple fact that we can
rely on a presumption of consent to altruistic behavior by children. Nevertheless, I
do not think that this would be the best strategy in the COVID-19 scenario. Isolating
children through the performance of testing in schools and institutes could be a better
alternative, since it would prevent them from spreading the disease without depriving
the elderly of a scarce resource, namely the vaccine.
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